Recent advances in modelling systemic risk using network analysis - ECB by Giansante, Simone
        
Citation for published version:
Giansante, S 2010, Recent advances in modelling systemic risk using network analysis - ECB. in The CDS
Network. pp. 11.
Publication date:
2010
Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
RECENT  ADVANCES  IN  MODELL ING  SYSTEM IC  R I SK 
US ING  NETWORK ANALYS I S
JANUARY  2010
EU
RO
PE
AN
 C
EN
TR
AL
 B
AN
K 
RECENT ADVANCES IN MODELLING 
SYSTEMIC RISK USING 
NETWORK ANALYSIS
J ANUARY  2010
In 2010 all ECB 
publications 
feature a motif 
taken from the 
€500 banknote.
© European Central Bank 2010
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main,
Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Telephone
+49 69 1344 0
Website
http://www.ecb.europa.eu
Fax
+49 69 1344 6000
All rights reserved. Reproduction 
for educational and non-commercial 
purposes is permitted provided that the 
source is acknowledged.
ISBN 978-92-899-0611-1 (online)
3
ECB
Recent advances in modelling systemic risk using network analysis
January 2010
CONTENTS
PREFACE 4
INTRODUCTION 5
DETAILED SUMMARY OF THE THEMES 9
SESSIONS
I Analysis of network topology, 
recent advances and applications 9
II Interdependencies among 
institutions, sectors 
and systems 16
III Interbank credit, markets 
and liquidity management 
in large value payment systems 21
IV System-level liquidity effects 
and networks in early warning 
models 25
4
ECB
Recent advances in modelling systemic risk using network analysis
January 2010
In October 2009, the ECB hosted a one-day 
workshop called “Recent advances in modelling 
systemic risk using network analysis”, which 
gathered together experts from central banks and 
from international organisations working in the 
fi elds of fi nancial stability and payment system 
analysis/oversight. The aim of the workshop was 
to exchange views and experiences in modelling 
and analysing systemic risk in different kinds of 
networks that are relevant to fi nancial stability 
and payment systems. The workshop also aimed 
to improve the awareness of network modelling 
in general, to enhance knowledge about the 
possibilities and limitations of this fi eld of 
analysis, and to exchange experiences in the use 
and formatting of data, computing techniques 
and analysis of results that have been obtained 
in various institutions. 
The global fi nancial crisis that erupted in 
August 2007 clearly illustrated the role of 
fi nancial linkages as a channel for propagation 
of shocks. Indeed, the spreading of the fi nancial 
turmoil from the US sub-prime mortgage 
market via the securitisation instruments to the 
banks’ off-balance-sheet vehicles and further to 
the banks’ balance sheets and to other fi nancial 
and non-fi nancial sectors exposed unforeseen 
counterparty linkages and eroded confi dence in 
a way which further amplifi ed the effect of the 
initial shocks. 
Research in the area of fi nancial network 
analysis has shown that modelling the 
interlinking exposures either between fi nancial 
institutions, among the sectors of the economy 
or across entire national fi nancial systems, can 
assist in detecting important shock transmission 
mechanisms. Simulation exercises using these 
networks may then reveal that parts of the 
systems that might not be considered vulnerable 
to given adverse scenarios could still be affected 
due to their close interconnection with agents 
that are directly confronted with the unforeseen 
events. Policy recommendations could then be 
targeted towards structural changes that mitigate 
the adverse consequences that may emerge in 
closely intertwined systems in times of crisis. 
Against this background, and in light of the 
recent institutional reforms concerning the global 
and European institutions for macroprudential 
supervision, improving the analytical capacity 
of central banks and international organisations 
entrusted with responsibilities in the areas of 
fi nancial stability and payment system oversight 
has become paramount. The presentations and 
discussions in the workshop that are summarised 
in this paper provide one contribution to that end. 
They highlight the potential of network theory 
to enhance the tools for market infrastructure 
oversight, counterparty risk management and 
macroprudential analysis and propose several 
avenues for future research. 
Any opinions expressed by the presenters, 
discussants, or chairpersons of sessions that are 
quoted in this paper are their own and do not 
necessarily refl ect the views and opinions of 
their respective institutions.
PREFACE
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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCT ION
Introductory remarks by Gertrude Tumpel-
Gugerell, Member of the Executive Board of 
the ECB 
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I would like to welcome you to the workshop 
on “Recent advances in modelling systemic 
risk using network analysis” here at the ECB. 
A workshop on systemic risk that provides an 
analytical focus on the fi nancial sector as a 
network of fi nancial agents could not come at a 
more timely moment. 
In 1896 the German sociologist Georg Simmel 
stated in his book “The Philosophy of Money”: 
“money is the spider that spins society’s web”. 
With this, Simmel already at the time pointed 
to the network aspect of money, how fi nancial 
innovation can transform the economy and 
society; and the transformation process as 
changes in the complexity, size and nature of 
economic and societal networks. 
The recent fi nancial crisis has strikingly 
illustrated the interconnectedness that 
characterises the global fi nancial system. 
In providing a framework for strengthening 
fi nancial stability, policy makers are currently 
not only refi ning the regulatory and institutional 
set-up, but also looking for new analytical 
tools that help to better identify, monitor and 
address sources of systemic risk. Therefore, 
I believe network analysis can make a relevant 
contribution and I am delighted that you have 
come together today to present and discuss new 
work in this fi eld.
Let me give you three questions (from the 
perspective of a policy maker) which today’s 
workshop would ideally shed light on:
What are the key channels and systemically 
important players that need special attention?
How can macro-prudential supervision take the 
interconnectedness into account? 
And can network methodologies provide us with 
a useful tool in this respect?
With these questions in mind, I have structured 
my introductory remarks into three parts. I will 
fi rst give a short assessment of the relevance of 
systemic risk in the modern fi nancial system. 
Then I will discuss the use of network theories 
for the analysis of systemic risk. Finally, I will 
briefl y refer to network applications to payment 
and fi nancial systems. 
SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE MODERN 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Systemic risk refers to the possibility that a 
triggering event such as a bank failure or a market 
disruption could cause widespread disruption 
of the fi nancial system, including signifi cant 
diffi culties in otherwise viable institutions or 
markets. Preventing these negative externalities 
from impairing the functioning of the system 
and from spilling over to the real economy is a 
crucial element of the mission of central banks 
and of supervisory authorities.
In the last two years, the functioning of the 
global fi nancial system has been challenged by 
an extraordinary sequence of such triggering 
events. This brought to the fore how complex 
and interconnected the fi nancial system had 
become and, consequently, how problems in 
one part of the system could reach other parts, 
also very distant ones.
In July and August 2007 the asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) market collapsed 
when investors realised that money market 
mutual funds had invested in paper backed by 
sub-prime assets. Investors became suddenly 
distrustful of all forms of private credit, 
especially structured products and other 
complex and opaque instruments, and this 
caused the funding for structured investment 
vehicles and special-purpose vehicles to dry 
up. Diffi culties faced by conduits and other 
asset-backed programmes in rolling over their 
short-term funding forced them to look to bank 
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sponsors for liquidity (this was the case, for 
instance, for IKB and Sachsen LB in Germany) 
or to sell assets. A crisis of confi dence ensued 
which gripped money market mutual funds and 
the commercial paper market, notwithstanding 
their distance from the US housing market.
Such unstable dynamics, set off by increasing 
uncertainty about the size of losses in the 
system and, maybe more importantly, about 
their exact location, continued in the course of 
2008. Then, the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008 transformed a pessimistic 
and disoriented mood into full-blown panic 
and paralysis.1
The biggest negative surprise following 
Lehman Brothers’ default was its effect on 
money market funds. When one fund, Reserve 
Primary, “broke the buck” (that is, the value 
of investors’ money fell below the notional 
amount invested), the sector was hit by a wave 
of redemptions that fuelled instability in the 
credit markets. Again, banks and companies 
relying on short-term funding through 
commercial paper or ABCP (i.e. debt backed 
by mortgages, credit cards and other consumer 
loans) could not roll over their debt, except at 
overnight maturities.
The ensuing dynamics in market participants’ 
behaviour clearly illustrate the presence of 
knock-on effects, negative externalities, and 
a coordination failure in the market network. 
Each institution responded rationally given 
individually available information. However, 
each rational response had repercussions for the 
whole system.
The impact of systemic risk depends very 
much on the collective behaviour of fi nancial 
institutions and their interconnectedness, as well 
as on the interaction between fi nancial markets 
and the macroeconomy. Systemic stability is 
a public good. The recognition of this public 
good property underpins the recent emphasis on 
a macro-prudential approach to regulation and 
supervision.
From a micro-prudential perspective, a 
strengthened supervision of individual 
institutions’ risk-taking incentives is also 
important. A key element of the risk management 
framework of banks is that they take into 
account, in terms of credit and liquidity risks, 
the exposure they have to particular (potentially 
systemically relevant) counterparties. Systemic 
risk is, in principle, outside the control of each 
individual institution. But, by keeping liquidity 
buffers and capital reserves and by limiting large 
exposures and addressing dependencies, banks 
can contribute to an increase in the resilience of 
the system as a whole. 
THE USE OF NETWORK THEORIES 
FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMIC RISK
The fi nancial crisis has reminded us how 
important it is to look at the links and 
connections of the fi nancial system. We saw 
that major disruptions such as failure or a near 
failure of certain institutions rapidly spilled over 
to the whole fi nancial system. 
Therefore, network theory can help us to 
analyze the systemic risk of such disruptions 
(i) by looking at how resilient the system is to 
contagion; and (ii) what the major triggers and 
channels of contagion are.
An important aspect of the analysis of systemic 
risk is that an apparently robust system may in 
fact be very fragile. This comes from the fact 
that a high number of interconnections within 
the network will serve as shock-amplifi ers rather 
than as absorbers.
Another key aspect of the analysis is that 
within the network of the fi nancial system, 
there are players with only a few connections, 
but also players that are highly connected. 
Obviously, such networks are extremely 
vulnerable if those highly connected players 
are disrupted. In fact, when a shock hits the 
system, the number of affected participants can 
 G. Tett (2009), “Markets 12 months after Lehman collapse”, 1 
Financial Times, 9 September.
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INTRODUCTION
be especially low, but the shock may still 
propagate system-wide. Payment systems, for 
instance, are networks with such a property.2 
Clearly, large and highly connected fi nancial 
institutions are systemically important. This 
has important implications for macro-prudential 
surveillance, and hence for fi nancial stability. 
Network analysis is crucial for the identifi cation 
of such systemically important institutions and 
markets which are critical players in the web 
of exposures. Monoline insurance providers 
and AIG provided an example of such critical 
institutions; key custodian banks or large 
correspondent banks play a similar role. 
Let me add to this, that a particular institution 
might not only be critical to the functioning 
of fi nancial markets or market infrastructures 
because other institutions are fi nancially 
exposed to it, but also because other market 
participants rely on the continued provision 
of its services. For us as policy makers this is 
a crucial point, as the impact of a failure of a 
given market player also hinges on the ability 
of the fi nancial infrastructure to support its 
resolution and to facilitate the orderly unwinding 
of positions. So let me now turn to the specifi c 
application of network theory to payment and 
fi nancial systems.
NETWORK ANALYSIS APPLICATIONS TO PAYMENT 
AND FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
Research in network theory has received 
relatively little attention in economics until the 
last decade. Therefore, I am delighted to see that 
this literature is growing and today’s workshop 
clearly illustrates its growing importance. 
The papers from today’s program highlight how 
direct and indirect interlinkages and contagion 
dynamics among fi nancial institutions, as well as 
among institutions, markets and infrastructures, 
can be signifi cantly infl uenced by three 
important network characteristics: First, the 
degree of connectivity, second, the degree of 
concentration and third, the size of exposures. 
We see from the papers that network analysis 
can help to better understand the interlinkages 
and systemic connections in many different 
segments of the fi nancial markets, ranging from 
money markets to networks of credit default 
swaps (CDSs), and from large-value payment 
systems to cross-sector exposures in the euro 
area fi nancial system.
We see that this research gives important insights 
into the various amplifi cation mechanisms 
in the global web of fi nancial connections. 
Such amplifi cation very much depends on a 
number of factors, such as the size of aggregate 
macroeconomic shocks, asset price volatility, 
liquidity risk and fi nancial leverage. Moreover, 
network analysis can be used to simulate the 
effect of credit and funding shocks on banking 
and fi nancial stability by taking into account – 
beyond the direct balance sheet exposures – also 
the impact of contingent claims and credit risk 
transfer techniques.
I am glad that the workshop brings together a 
wide variety of applications. It demonstrates two 
key points: fi rst, network analysis is advancing 
as a common tool for assessing dynamics 
within the various parts of the fi nancial sector 
(from payment systems to interbank balance 
sheet exposures); and second, it reveals that 
a truly systemic perspective needs to combine 
the focus on various parts of the fi nancial sector 
with an analysis of the interlinkages among 
them, ideally including the interaction with the 
real economy. This is, of course, an ambitious 
objective that calls for further research. 
CONCLUSIONS
Let me conclude. The recent fi nancial crisis has 
underscored the need for policy makers and 
regulators worldwide to track systemic linkages.
 See M. Pröpper et al. (2008), “Towards a network description 2 
of interbank payment fl ows”, DNB Working Paper No. 177, for 
an analysis of Dutch payment fl ows; C. Puhr and S. W. Schmitz 
(2009), “Structure and stability in payment networks – a panel 
data analysis of ARTIS simulations” in H. Leinonen (ed.), 
Simulation analyses and stress testing of payment networks, 
Bank of Finland, for the Austrian large-value payment system; 
and K. Soramäki et al. (2007), “The topology of interbank 
payment fl ows”, Physica A, Vol. 379, pp. 317-333, for an 
analysis of Fedwire, the large-value payment system operated by 
the Federal Reserve.
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Network analysis offers a very relevant 
tool for addressing this challenge. Its focus 
on interconnectedness and on systemically 
important market players makes it especially 
relevant for the assessment of the fragility or 
resilience of the fi nancial system as a whole. 
By applying network theories we can benefi t 
from the important progress made in other 
sciences to monitor and assess systemic risks, 
direct and indirect linkages, vulnerabilities and 
contagion. This is because networks allow us to 
look beyond the immediate “point of impact” of 
a shock and, hence, also to the spillovers likely 
to arise from interlinkages in the system. Thus, 
network analysis can undoubtedly provide 
useful guidance for the analysis of systemic risk 
and can be a key tool for the future analysis of 
such risk. 
For us, such analysis will be of crucial 
importance. As you know a European Systemic 
Risk Board will be established with the mandate 
to map fi nancial risks and their concentration at 
the system level for the macro-prudential 
supervision of systemic stability. The mandates 
of other supranational institutions and fora, such 
as the IMF and the Financial Stability Board, 
also refer to network aspects of the fi nancial 
system that have become apparent during the 
current crisis and that should be taken into 
account in order to obtain new measures of 
fi nancial fragility.3
Also for the specifi c fi eld of market 
infrastructures the relevance of network effects 
is being taken into account. The market for credit 
default swaps (CDS) has clearly revealed its 
systemic importance, as the default of one major 
counterparty has put the whole system under 
severe strain. Therefore, I welcome very much 
that central counterparties for credit default 
swaps have been established to address fi rst, the 
high degree of interconnectivity between CDS 
markets and credit and cash securities markets, 
second, the high leverage embedded in these 
fi nancial instruments, and third, the signifi cant 
concentration of related risks in a small group of 
major market players. Effective implementation 
of central clearing of derivatives enables a 
signifi cant reduction in counterparty risk, hence 
addressing some of the negative externalities 
that stem from the over-the-counter network 
that has formed over the years.4
Interlinkages within the fi nancial system 
are nothing fundamentally new. However, 
business strategies developed by fi nancial 
institutions over the last 20 years and fi nancial 
innovations have made the system much more 
interconnected, complex and opaque than it was 
in the past. 
I believe that policy makers and regulators of 
today will be judged in the future on the basis 
of the regulatory measures and analytical tools 
they have applied to address the root causes 
of the crisis. A key challenge is to transcend a 
purely national or sector-specifi c perspective 
and to take an approach that matches the global 
nature of fi nancial networks. A key prerequisite 
for network analysis as a surveillance tool 
remains, however, the availability of relevant 
data. This holds true especially on a cross-border 
basis, but also at bank level. Going forward, 
regulators and overseers should continue to 
develop ways to systematically collect and 
analyse data. The crisis has clearly demonstrated 
that data confi dentiality must not stand in the 
way of improvements in systemic risk analysis 
and assessment by policy makers.
Once more, I welcome you to this workshop 
and I wish you productive and enriching 
discussions on this very relevant topic.
See IMF (2009), “Global Financial Stability Report”, Chapter II 3 
on Assessing the Systemic Implications of Financial Linkages, 
April, and E. Nier et al. (2007), “Network models and fi nancial 
stability”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 31, 
pp. 2033-2060.
See also ECB (2009), “OTC derivatives and post-trading 4 
infrastructures”, September.
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DETAILED SUMMARY 
OF THE THEMES
DETA ILED SUMMARY OF  THE  THEMES
SESSION I – ANALYSIS OF NETWORK TOPOLOGY, 
RECENT ADVANCES AND APPLICATIONS
The fi rst session of the workshop, chaired by 
Ignazio Angeloni, provided an overview of the 
techniques and the methodologies of network 
analysis and of recent applications aiming to 
model and better understand the 
interconnectedness of fi nancial and payment 
systems. The fi rst presentation, made by 
Kimmo Soramäki,5 provided the audience with 
a general introduction to the topic, as well as 
with concrete applications, illustrating the 
potential of this tool for policy purposes. 
The title – “Is network theory the best hope for 
regulating systemic risk?” – refers to the recent 
argument made by some policy makers and 
economists that network topology could 
represent a new and key tool for taking into 
account contagion and systemic risk.6 
The second paper, presented by Sheri Markose, 
provided an in-depth empirical mapping of the 
fi nancial network created by credit default swap 
(CDS) obligations among US banks, and 
between banks and non-regulated entities 
(monoline insurers and hedge funds) involved 
as protection buyers and protection sellers. 
The long-term aim of this research is to establish 
fully digital and database-driven network 
mappings of key fi nancial sectors for systemic 
risk modelling and assessment.
INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPICS
Kimmo Soramäki organised his presentation 
around three policy questions:
1. How can we measure the systemic 
importance of a bank?
2. Can regulators promote a safer fi nancial 
system by affecting its topology?
3. Is it possible to devise early warning 
indicators from real-time data?
Soramäki provided a brief overview of the 
general fi ndings of network theory that make 
straightforward the potential for its application 
to the analysis of fi nancial networks. Networks 
are broadly defi ned as collections of nodes 
(banks) and links (in the form of credit and 
fi nancial relationships). The links that exist 
between the nodes affect the attributes of the 
nodes (for example, banks’ balance sheets are 
affected by existing links with other banks), 
and the structure of the links affects the 
performance of the system as a whole. There are 
a number of common properties shared by many 
large and complex networks that are of particular 
interest for policy makers today, as they allow 
for a better understanding of recent fi nancial 
network dynamics. These are as follows:
The “robust yet fragile” property of scale-• 
free networks, i.e. of systems where the 
probability of fi nding a node with a high 
degree (high number of links) is very low, 
while the probability of a node having a few 
connections is very high. This property refers 
to the robustness of a connected network in 
the case of random removal of a node (given 
the high frequency of low-degree nodes), 
versus its fragility in the case of a targeted 
attack directed against one of the few highly 
connected vertices (which could represent, 
for instance, a fi nancial hub).
The “strength of weak ties”, which refers • 
to the relative importance – in terms of 
availability/dissemination of information – 
of weak versus strong connections in shaping 
the topology of the network.
“Homophily”, i.e. the concept that certain • 
attributes tend to set up clusters of nodes.
The “small world phenomenon”, by which • 
the number of links covering the distance 
between any two nodes tends to be relatively 
low (or network paths are short). This might 
have interesting implications for episodes of 
Kimmo Soramäki has recently created a website www.5 
fi nancialnetworkanalysis.com, which aims to gather research in 
this relatively unexplored fi eld of fi nancial economics. 
See, for instance, IMF (2009), “Global Financial Stability 6 
Report”, Chapter II on Assessing the Systemic Implications of 
Financial Linkages, and A. G. Haldane (2009), “Rethinking the 
fi nancial network”, speech delivered at the Financial Student 
Association, Amsterdam, in April.
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contagion in many real world small networks, 
since the number of affected nodes above 
which epidemics propagate system-wide is 
especially low (and it can be zero).7
In applying these fi ndings to fi nancial networks 
one needs to consider the process taking place 
in the network and behaviour of the nodes in the 
particular fi eld of application.8
A crucial characteristic of the structure of 
network processes is their centrality (i.e., in a 
broad sense, the relevance of the position of a 
node in the network).9 Centrality might give an 
insight into which nodes should be considered 
of “systemic importance”. However, Soramäki 
also made clear the limits of available centrality 
measures, since, although able to capture the 
type of fl ow-processes in the network, they do 
not currently capture any complex behaviour by 
the vertices, i.e. the drivers behind each node’s 
choice to set up certain links and the magnitude 
of the links that are set up.
The lack of behavioural aspects is perhaps the 
main criticism addressed to network analysis by 
many economists today. The resulting 
mechanical representation of how the structure 
is created and evolves over time cannot fully 
capture feedback loops and endogenous 
responses which are, however, at the core of 
fi nancial networks’ developments. Indeed, the 
current crisis has shown how network processes 
can change in a sudden and unpredictable 
fashion. “Agent-based modelling” (relying on 
algorithms and simulations) is one recent 
approach devised to tackle this shortcoming.10 
 M. Bech, W. E. Beyeler, R. J. Glass and K. Soramäki in “Network 7 
topology and payment system resilience”, BoF Simulation Seminar, 
23 August 2006, provide evidence on how the “small world” property 
might affect interbank payment fl ows after the occurrence of a 
payment outage at a large bank. They show that scale-free, long-tailed 
networks display the highest rate of liquidity absorption after such a 
shock (the rate of absorption being the rapidity with which a certain 
amount of liquidity is absorbed by/sent to the distressed bank).
S. Borgatti (2005), “Centrality and network fl ow”, 8 Social Networks.
“Centrality” may be measured by the number of links that 9 
terminate upon a node (in degree), by the distance from other 
vertices (closeness), or by the existing connections to central 
nodes. A measure of centrality particularly suitable for fi nancial 
networks is the betweenness centrality of a node, defi ned as the 
number of shortest paths that pass through the node.
An “agent-based model” (ABM) is a computational model for 10 
simulating the actions and interactions of autonomous individual 
agents with a view to assessing their effects on the system as a 
whole. A key concept in an ABM is that simple decision-making 
rules can generate complex behaviour at the system level.
Chart 1 Types of networks
Complete network
Random network
Scale-free network
Source:
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DETAILED SUMMARY 
OF THE THEMES
For instance, Soramäki discussed a model of a 
real time gross settlement (RTGS) payment 
system with 15 banks introducing behavioural 
rules for each bank’s decision about (i) the share 
of payments it has “queued” at any moment, 
and (ii) the size of net exposure it wants to have 
towards a single counterparty in relation to the 
total value of sent payments. Running 
simulations on the basis of these rules, 
the authors study how the centrality of a failing 
bank (removed for the whole day from the 
network) correlates with additional liquidity 
demand from the whole system. The more 
non-linearities the system exhibits due to bank 
behaviour or liquidity constraints, the weaker is 
the correlation of the failure impact with the 
centrality measures.
Concerning the possibility for policy makers to 
promote safer topologies, Soramäki referred to 
CLS, the world’s largest settlement system for 
foreign exchange trades, as an example where 
the fi nancial links of an institution are severely 
restricted for the purpose of fi nancial safety. 
CLS is not allowed to have any non-FX 
settlement related links to the fi nancial 
infrastructure. Another example is the 
introduction by regulators of sectoral barriers to 
banking, such as those introduced by the Glass-
Steagall Act in 1933. A recent case in point is 
the introduction of central counterparty clearing 
for CDSs. Soramäki expanded on this last 
example by outlining research that he has done 
on the topology of the network that develops 
around the central counterparty (CCP).11 
This work studies the impact of different 
network structures – determined by the extent of 
tiering (i.e. the number of banks that participate 
directly in the CCP) and the concentration of 
clients across fi rst tier (direct) clearers – on the 
maximum exposure of the CCP. The results 
show that the higher the level of tiering 
(i.e. the lower the number of members clearing 
directly in the CCP and the higher the number 
of indirect participants) and the higher the level 
of clients’ concentration, the lower the CCP’s 
maximum expected exposure. However, 
high tiering (for a given concentration) makes 
CCP’s exposures more dispersed and increases 
the likelihood of larger exposure concentrations 
relative to a “star” format network (i.e. relative 
to the limiting case where clearers are 
all direct).
Finally, as regards the scope to devise early 
warning indicators from real data, Soramäki 
raised the possibility of central banks constructing 
such indicators – e.g. increased riskiness or 
worsened liquidity conditions of banks – 
by using the same kind of network techniques 
used by credit card companies on customers’ 
payment behaviour to detect card frauds. For 
instance, payment data could be used to detect 
features in the timing of payments sent to and 
from the bank, in net outfl ows across different 
systems, in the bank’s money market activity or 
in the volume of cash withdrawals/deposits made 
by the public, factors which are rather common 
across available examples of failed banks.
THE CDS NETWORK
The paper by Sheri Markose, Simone Giansante, 
Mateusz Gatkowski and Ali Rais Shaghaghi, 
“Too interconnected to fail: fi nancial networks 
of CDS and other credit enhancement obligations 
of US banks”, responds in part to Soramäki’s 
agenda of key policy questions. The authors 
apply agent-based modelling to a fi nancial 
network and use simulation results to devise an 
operational measure of systemic risk. The focus 
on CDSs stems from the “unique, endemic and 
pernicious role” that these instruments had in the 
current crisis. The authors argue that incentives 
provided by the credit risk transfer (CRT) scheme 
included in the Basel II accord could have 
contributed to the rapid expansion of this market. 
One potential consequence of banks’ ability to 
reduce regulatory capital requirements by using 
CRT techniques has been the growing popularity 
of synthetic securitisations, with the consequent 
dispersion of products and risks worldwide in 
complex chains of insurance and reinsurance 
against credit default risk (see Chart 2). 
According to the authors, the large amounts 
outstanding and the relatively high concentration 
M. Galbiati and K. Soramäki (2009), 11 Central counterparties and 
the topology of clearing networks, forthcoming.
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of risks to a few dominant players has brought to 
the fore the “too interconnected to fail” paradigm. 
To avoid such problems in the future, Markose 
et al. suggest setting up stress testing exercises 
for new fi nancial instruments and propose such 
stress tests for the US CDS network.
The authors reconstruct their network using 
CDS linkages among the top 25 US banks and 
the external non-bank insurers. Market shares 
are taken as a proxy for actual bilateral 
exposures. Specifi c “small world” network 
properties and the loss impact suffered by each 
participant (in terms of core capital loss due to 
the failure of a major player) from its activity in 
the CDS market are computed.12 This allows the 
authors to investigate the robustness of a 
topology in which the top fi ve US banks 
accounted for 98% of the reported CDS gross 
notional value at the end of 2008, while the non-
bank entities had the highest clustering of links 
with the top four banks.
According to the results of agent-based 
simulations presented in the paper, bailouts 
of institutions with very large numbers of 
links – notwithstanding their possible technical 
insolvency – could not be averted: the 
simulations show how a credit event at one such 
critical hub could have brought down part of the 
whole CDS market, with a consequent impact 
on the whole fi nancial system.
The analysis reveals the presence of “super-
spreaders” in the CDS network, i.e. large 
protection sellers who are highly “central” in the 
market in terms of clustering and connectivity 
measures, and whose capital bases – although 
comfortably fulfi lling regulatory requirements – 
could be considered low when account is taken 
of the system-wide capital loss they may impose 
if they are assumed to fail in these simulation 
exercises. The same experiment is then simulated 
on a random (i.e. not hub-clustered) network. 
It is worth noting that, although the random 
graph has no nodes which are highly connected 
and also has lower network concentration or 
clustering, the consequences of its unravelling 
when hit by a shock may be more severe 
The authors conduct two experiments. In both, they use a 12 
20% reduction of core capital as a threshold to identify bank 
failures induced by the default of a triggering bank. The fi rst 
test considers only the loss of CDS cover due to the failed 
bank suspending its guarantees as a counterparty. In the second 
experiment, the triggering bank is itself a CDS reference entity, 
which activates obligations from other CDS market participants. 
Furthermore, loss of cover owing to the triggering bank’s default 
on exposures to special purpose vehicles and owing to other 
credit enhancements is considered. 
Chart 2 The CDS chain structure and bear raids 1)
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Source: S. Markose (Workshop presentation, 2009).
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(22 banks out of 25 fail rather than only fi ve 
as in the previous case). At the same time, the 
dynamics that bring down the system develops 
over several consecutive rounds (following the 
demise of the triggering bank), and not just 
after the fi rst one. This might have important 
implications for regulators and central banks 
aiming at promoting a safer fi nancial system, and 
suggests the need to be cautious in promoting 
any form of “ideal” network topology.
Markose and her co-authors emphasise the 
need to incorporate institutional rules and 
behavioural aspects to obtain an adequate 
modelling of systemic risk and fi nancial 
contagion. In particular, they discuss how agent-
based models can address the failure of other 
economic tools to take into account systemic 
risk, heterogeneity in agents’ strategies, and 
interconnectedness of relationships, that make 
the system prone to non-linear and extreme 
non-Gaussian dynamics when hit by a shock.
As regards regulatory solutions to the implicit 
“too big to fail” insurance enjoyed by large 
market players, the authors argue in favour of a 
price/tax to be imposed/levied on super-
spreaders – possibly identifi ed on the basis of 
the proposed “systemic risk ratio” (SRR) – to 
refl ect the negative externalities imposed by 
these market participants on the whole system.13 
More generally, a price on the operations of 
“systemically important” players is regarded as 
an adequate measure to provide banks and 
especially non-banks (e.g. non-regulated 
monolines in CDS markets) with more aligned 
incentives to engage in over-supply of a given 
fi nancial activity or instrument. Overall, based 
on their evidence, the authors suggest that it 
might be benefi cial if the large negative 
externalities that arise from the possible demise 
of a big player in the CDS network were taken 
into account when banks are allowed to reduce 
capital on assets that have CDS protection.
Finally, welcoming the recent introduction of 
central counterparty clearing (CCP) in CDS 
markets, Markose et al. propose the use of agent-
based stress-tests to estimate the amount of capital 
that a CCP should hold and the use of network 
indicators to make members’ contributions to the 
CCP’s capital or clearing fund proportional to 
their potential systemic impact. The authors also 
mention the possibility of changing the existing 
requirements on initial and on variation margins 
that market participants are required to post and 
hold as part of their risk controls.
MAIN COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION
Commenting on both papers, Johannes 
Lindner, discussant for this fi rst session, agreed 
with the presenters on the crucial importance 
of agent-based modelling for understanding 
fi nancial networks and especially their complex 
dynamics under distressed conditions. He said 
that this would be decisive in further 
strengthening of fi nancial network analysis and 
would allow its establishment as an additional 
analytic tool for policy makers and regulators.
While recognising the potential of this new 
instrument, the discussant also pointed out 
the importance of a clearer categorisation 
of which shocks and crisis dynamics could 
be best understood using network analysis 
rather than other tools. For instance, network 
statistics computed after past failures of a 
market participant could be more useful inputs 
to early warning indicators designed to predict 
the impact of sudden idiosyncratic shocks on 
a fi nancial entity than variables which capture 
the build-up of macro imbalances over time. 
Moreover, he mentioned how network analysis 
and simulations, even if “agent-based”, might 
be less suited to capturing certain market 
imperfections, such as incomplete markets and 
asymmetric or imperfect information.
Lindner agreed that there was an opportunity 
to exploit today’s computer-power to map 
network structures. To this end, he stressed 
the importance of getting access to data not 
only at the level of individual networks, but 
especially across networks and across national 
For each trigger bank or non-bank CDS provider, the SRR 13 
estimates the percentage loss in aggregate core capital resulting 
from its collapse.
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borders. Even acknowledging the limits to 
mapping complex adaptive systems in a unitary 
framework, the development of a comprehensive 
network perspective remains a key requirement 
for policy makers and regulators.
For instance, concerning the empirical 
reconstruction of the CDS network provided by 
Markose et al., Lindner recognised its merit as a 
good fi rst approximation of bilateral exposures 
in the market. However, depending on data 
availability, a cross-check with actual bilateral 
exposures among participants, as well as the 
inclusion of Europe and/or other markets would 
be important in order to obtain a more reliable 
basis for policy implications.
An important point raised by many participants 
was whether network measures could represent 
an appropriate tool to identify systemically 
important market players and how these 
measures could be integrated in the existing 
toolbox of regulators. This is strongly related to 
the issue of how to address institutions’ systemic 
importance and, therefore, of how regulators 
could encourage safer topologies. On this aspect, 
Markose et al. argue in their paper that imposing 
a “tax” on the operations of critical players could 
be one way of providing fi nancial institutions 
with more aligned incentives and hence contain 
risks. Moreover, concerning the very recent 
move towards central counterparty clearing in 
CDS markets, Lindner concurred with Soramäki 
and Markose that this is a key example of 
how improvements in the infrastructure and 
encouragement from public authorities can 
affect the robustness of the fi nancial system.
A CCP reduces counterparty risk, increases 
market liquidity and strengthens transparency. 
However, it also concentrates systemic risk. 
This makes the establishment of a strict risk 
management framework and adequate oversight 
by regulators essential. Similar to the need to 
regulate systemic risk and systemically relevant 
market players in the fi nancial sector more 
broadly, the risk concentration in a CCP requires 
the combination of different risk controls – 
participation requirements, initial and variation 
margins, and fi nancial resources (i.e. CCP’s 
own capital or clearing fund) – to address the 
risks stemming from its participants.
Concerning the possibility of imposing a price 
on the operations of systemically important 
players, the subsequent discussion revealed that, 
from the point of view of regulators and 
overseers, a key operational issue would concern 
the exact defi nition of a critical participant 
(should authorities use a binary indicator or 
should different layers of “criticality” be 
considered?) and the way in which network 
connectivity could be taken into account in 
addition to traditional balance sheet or activity 
measures (i.e. size and volumes/values). One of 
the participants put forward the proposal to 
integrate existing risk management tools 
(e.g., CoVaR analysis) with network measures 
for regulatory purposes.14
A main caveat raised during the discussion 
on the identifi cation of key market players 
concerned the inadequacy of indicators that 
are solely based on participants’ exposures in a 
particular market/instrument. Ignazio Angeloni, 
chairman of the session, pointed out how such 
“narrow-view” indicators could actually provide 
a misleading picture on the criticality of a 
certain participant. In fact, an institution which 
is relatively small in one particular market could 
still be “central” in the network due to its uneven 
exposure to a large and highly connected player. 
Its demise might then still have a large impact 
on other participants in the system.
The particular usefulness of network tools 
for visualising direct linkages among market 
players and, depending on data availability, 
links across different markets is generally 
acknowledged. However, some participants 
See IMF (2009), “Global Financial Stability Report”, Chapter II, 14 
and M. Brunnermeier et al. (2009), “The Fundamental 
Principles of Financial Regulation,” Geneva Reports on the 
World Economy, 11.
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to the workshop expressed doubts about the 
scope of network analysis alone to understand 
the identity of factors driving the expansion of 
a fi nancial market/instrument over time, or how 
a certain institution becomes a “key” player 
for a given market. Such an understanding is 
critical for regulators. The endogeneity of a 
market structure – which is the outcome of a 
dynamic process taking place over time – makes 
any policy intervention extremely diffi cult. 
On this part, while acknowledging this 
diffi culty, Soramäki emphasised his conviction 
that this should not prevent the regulators from 
trying to use all the tools available to them to 
devise mechanisms that have the potential to 
mitigate risks ex ante and, therefore, to make 
the fi nancial system safer.
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SESSION II – INTERDEPENDENCIES AMONG 
INSTITUTIONS, SECTORS AND SYSTEMS
The second session of the workshop, chaired 
by Paul Mercier, brought together two papers 
on the theme of interdependencies among 
institutions, sectors and systems.
The experience of the recent crisis has shown 
that even the failure of relatively small but 
well connected entities can have unforeseeable 
negative fi nancial consequences through 
contagious effects. For researchers, this poses 
new challenges as a better understanding of 
the structure and the functioning of fi nancial 
networks is key to preventing risks inherently 
present in the system.
Following this line of investigation, the 
presentation given by Morten Bech enhanced 
the understanding of settlement behaviour of 
Fedwire participants before, during and after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers. Network analysis 
provides an adequate toolbox to analyse and 
visualise the daily changes of settlements in 
the Fedwire network as well as the increased 
behavioural coordination of its participants.
In contrast to the application of network 
analysis based on individual payments, 
Olli Castrén presented a paper looking at 
sector level interdependencies in the euro area 
fi nancial system. Network analyses of this kind 
have so far been conducted on fi rm level and on 
country level, leaving an unexplored gap at the 
intermediate stage.
FEDWIRE SETTLEMENTS
The fi rst paper of the session, entitled “Payments, 
crunch and easing” by Morten Bech and 
Ian Adelstein, uses network analysis to explore 
the changing pattern of Fedwire settlements 
following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy.
The authors introduce a threefold concept by 
distinguishing between market, funding and 
settlement liquidity. While the focus of the paper 
lies in the latter, it also points to existing links 
between settlement and funding as well as 
settlement and market liquidity, emphasizing 
possible economic implications that can result 
from such interlinkages.15
In order to fi nd out how major Fedwire 
participants changed their behaviour in terms 
of delayed settlements, the authors consider 
two shocks that actually materialised. Firstly, 
the impact of the failure of Lehman Brothers 
on liquidity and payment fl ows is explored. 
The injection of liquidity into the fi nancial 
system by the Federal Reserve following the 
bankruptcy of Lehman is considered to be the 
second shock to Fedwire.
Focusing on payments settled in the system, 
Bech and Adelstein identify changing liquidity 
conditions by looking at different patterns 
of settlement timing on a daily basis from the 
end of March 2008 until 1 September 2009. 
Settlement liquidity in Fedwire is measured 
using data about the degree of daily settlement 
delays, dividing the period of interest 
into pre-crisis, crisis (Lehman’s default) and 
post-crisis periods.
The authors fi nd that prior to the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers the average settlement time 
was around 2:30 p.m. whereas it averaged as 
late as 3:10 p.m. in the two weeks following 
this major bankruptcy. During the last 
period under consideration, as a result of the 
liquidity injection by the Federal Reserve, 
settlements were undertaken considerably 
earlier – on average at 2 p.m. (see Chart 3).
However, settlements in Fedwire typically 
vary due to calendar effects. In order to net out 
such infl uences, the authors run a regression 
using dummies for days that are known to 
have different settlement timings. The actual 
delay due to non-calendar effects is then to be 
found in the regression residuals which provide 
a net measure of average settlement timing. 
 Bech and Adelstein point to the failure of Bear Stearns in March 15 
2008 as one prominent example of how lacks in settlement 
liquidity can negatively affect the availability of funding liquidity 
for all market players.
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The results support previous fi ndings in terms of 
time-shifts of settlements prior to, following and 
during the period of acute impact of Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy.
After operationalising the variables at hand, the 
authors employ network techniques to visualise 
the deteriorated degree of liquidity in Fedwire. 
The analysis is narrowed down to all business 
days in September 2008 and to a core set of 
16 Fedwire participants. By doing so, the paper 
keeps its focus on the actual period of interest, 
as well as on the turbulences caused by the 
shock event to other actors in the same fi nancial 
environment. The authors showed that, until 
12 September 2008, settlement behaviour was 
normal. However, this changed dramatically 
throughout the two weeks following 
15 September, the day Lehman Brothers fi led 
for bankruptcy. After that date, signifi cant 
degrees of delay within Fedwire are observed, 
reaching a peak on 17 and 19 September with the 
majority of links refl ecting overdue payments
(see Chart 4). According to the authors, this 
observation can be considered an indicator of 
the effect of a systemic shock to the network.
Bech and Adelstein conclude their paper with 
an analysis of the coordination of settlements 
among Fedwire participants in the light of 
a changing liquidity environment. Using 
daily time series of the correlations of the 
75th percentile settlement times across 72 Fedwire 
participants, they examine the differences in 
settlement coordination for three distinct periods, 
i.e. pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis.
Based on correlation matrices, a distribution of 
correlations for each single period is obtained. 
In line with the fi ndings of the former part of the 
paper, it is again the period immediately after 
Lehman Brothers’ default that differs from both 
the baseline and the post-crisis period, showing a 
higher degree of correlation in settlement timing.
The robustness of these results is underlined 
by applying the method to a subset of 16 major 
Fedwire participants. The results show that these 
display an even stronger tendency to coordinate 
behaviour, and they actually seem to be driving 
the heightened coordination in the “crisis” period. 
To further illustrate their results, Bech and 
Adelstein make use of network techniques to 
visually highlight the differences in coordination 
settlements throughout the three periods under 
consideration.
EURO AREA FINANCIAL NETWORKS 
The second presentation was given by 
Olli Castrén on a joint paper with Ilja Kristian 
Kavonius entitled “Balance sheet contagion and 
systemic risk in the euro area fi nancial system: 
a network approach”.
Chart 4 Fedwire settlement delays 
on September 17, 2008
Source: M. Bech and I. Adelstein (2009).
Chart 3 Average time of Fedwire 
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At the beginning of his presentation, Castrén 
briefl y summarised the work already done on 
the topic at the macro level as well as at the 
micro level. He pointed to the fact that an 
analysis of accounting-based balance sheet 
interlinkages at sector level has never been 
conducted before. In addition, he argued that, 
in order to incorporate elements of risk into the 
analysis, it is necessary to construct “risk-based 
balance sheets” which also include volatility 
of asset values.
The authors use quarterly non-consolidated data 
from 1999 onwards on euro area fi nancial 
accounts (EAA), based on the methodological 
framework established in the European System 
of Accounts 1995 (ESA95). By doing so, they 
analyse a closed system of assets and liabilities 
spread among seven distinct sectors.16 Since 
these data do not contain any information about 
the counterparties of the instrument issued by a 
given sector, the “maximum entropy” technique 
is used to approximate these allocations. Finally, 
matrices of bilateral exposures, refl ecting the 
amounts of assets and liabilities as well as the 
instrument category they belong to, were 
constructed for inter as well as intra-sectoral 
balance sheet relationships.17
With this information to hand, a complete network 
linking all sectors together by summing up assets 
and liabilities for a total of eight instrument 
categories is obtained. Castrén presented snapshots 
of these networks of balance sheet gross exposures 
in the euro area at instrument level for the fi rst 
quarter of 1999 and for the second quarter of 2009 
respectively (see Chart 5). 
Comparing these snapshots, three main 
developments become evident:
1. an overall increase in balance sheet 
exposures suggesting a higher level of 
interconnectedness in the euro area fi nancial 
system;
2. the “hub” position of the banking sector, as 
revealed by the large weight of its links to 
counterparties; and
3. the increasing importance of the other 
fi nancial intermediary sector over the past 
ten years.
In fact, networks which are derived from the 
balance sheet exposures do not only help to 
visualise the units of analysis and the links 
between them. Network analysis also offers 
features that allow the modelling and tracing 
of contagious effects and knock-on events 
in the system. Making use of this quality, 
the paper fi rst considers a simplifi ed three 
sector model and assumes an unanticipated 
net income shock resulting in a defi cit for 
one of the sectors’ profi t and loss accounts. 
 The set of sectors consists of the following: households, 16 
non-fi nancial corporations, banks, insurance companies and 
pension funds, other fi nancial intermediaries, government, and 
the rest of the world.
 The intra-sectoral exposures can thus be found on the matrix 17 
diagonal.
Chart 5 Cross-sector balance sheet gross 
exposures in the euro area financial system
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Then, mark-to-market accounting is assumed, 
leading to a faster transmission of the shock 
throughout the network, i.e. to the balance sheet 
of the other sectors.
To demonstrate how a similar shock could be 
transmitted in the network of sectoral balance 
sheet exposures, the authors introduce a 
cash-fl ow shock in the non-fi nancial corporations 
(NFCs) sector that causes a 20% mark-to-market 
drop in the value of shareholders’ equity. In the 
fi rst round, above all, the NFCs sector itself as 
well as the other fi nancial intermediaries (OFIs) 
and the government sectors are those most 
heavily affected. In the subsequent rounds, the 
most affected sectors are those which hold large 
amounts of equity issued by those sectors which 
were adversely affected by the initial shock in 
the fi rst round.
In this context, Castrén emphasised that, 
in a multi-period framework and when hit by 
a shock, agents are expected to rebalance their 
accounts by deleveraging, disinvesting or similar 
actions – a scenario not incorporated in the current 
analysis. Nevertheless, the presented network can 
be used to simulate the effects of such actions 
once relevant rules and thresholds are specifi ed 
and modelling problems have been overcome.
In the second part of the paper, contingent 
claims analysis (CCA) is applied to enhance the 
framework by accounting for the accumulation 
and transmission of risk exposures in the 
fi nancial system, thus overcoming its current 
deterministic character. Risk-based balance 
sheets at sector level can be constructed by 
applying CCA, thus making it possible to 
conduct a macro fi nancial risk analysis as the 
propagation of risk exposures across sectors can 
be examined.
Castrén and Kavonius use the “distance-
to-distress” measure obtained from CCA 
(see Chart 6) to capture how risk exposures 
in sectors that were not directly struck by the 
initial NFC cash-fl ow shock considered above 
were also affected via contagion across balance 
sheet items.
The authors fi nd a large discrepancy in impacts 
and argue that this could stem from the 
non-linear character of the changes in risk 
exposures as a reaction to volatility shocks in 
sectors that are characterised by high leverage. 
Furthermore, they state that, owing to these 
non-linearities in risk exposures, the 
interconnections may serve as risk-spreading 
shock amplifi ers in a crisis situation, whereas 
they are assumed to perform the functions 
of risk sharing and shock absorption in 
normal times.
Concluding his presentation, Castrén emphasised 
that more research needs to be conducted in 
order to refi ne propagation mechanisms in such 
networks.
MAIN COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION
The discussant of the second session, 
Goetz von Peter, commented fi rst on the 
paper presented by Castrén. He emphasised the 
innovative approach of conducting a systemic 
risk analysis on the European sector level, a unit 
of analysis not yet examined.
Chart 6 Sector level distances-to-distress 
for the euro area financial system
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At the same time, he recommended clarifying 
the signifi cance of cross-holdings between some 
sectors. This brought Von Peter to a general 
concern: the high degree of data aggregation. 
In the construction process, existing 
heterogeneity within each sector is averaged 
out, inevitably resulting in a loss of information. 
Consequently, the question of the extent to which 
such balance sheets remain interpretable arises. 
In particular, sector-wide balance sheets might 
be misleading, as solvent units are unlikely to 
support failing units in the same sector. 
Von Peter went on to state that, although the 
authors acknowledge such data limitations, 
they do not always explain what this means for 
the results. In addition, the application of the 
maximum entropy technique by construction 
leads to a complete network, obviating the 
inclusion of statements on degree distribution 
or the like.
In review of the paper presented by Bech, 
Von Peter underlined the insights gained in 
studying a unique event (the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy) in the data-rich environment of 
Fedwire. He commended the focus on settlement 
liquidity as an interesting choice and praised the 
inclusion of behavioural aspects.
However, further exploration is needed on 
the selection of parameter thresholds in the 
paper, as they appear to be of a rather arbitrary 
nature. Improvements can also be made by 
stating precisely whether it was the type of 
payment or the type of participant that led the 
authors to conclude whether or not there was 
discretion in when the payment needed to be 
sent. More importantly, Von Peter questioned 
the use of correlations to quantify coordinated 
delays, as they only deliver information about 
the tendency of participants to move together, 
whether late or early. Furthermore, he felt that 
further exploitation of the network structure that 
the authors had constructed would be desirable. 
For instance, considering transitive relationships 
(e.g. clustering) would help explain why 
delayed incoming payments would lead a bank 
to also delay sending payments. Additionally, 
the discussant posed an open question on 
whether delays are indeed the main feature 
of stress. Other aspects, such as volumes of 
payments and failures, may be equally important 
for assessing tensions. 
The subsequent discussion by the workshop 
participants mainly focused on the changing 
nature of networks, which needs to be taken 
into consideration. Furthermore, the use of 
aggregated data was discussed, as macro level 
networks are well connected by construction, 
making the application of some network topology 
measures somewhat uninformative. It was also 
pointed out that network properties become 
increasingly non-linear the more aggregated the 
data are. This leads to interpretational biases, as 
the underlying structure between the network 
components is not correctly captured.  Another 
suggestion concerned the inclusion of robustness 
tests in both papers. This can be done, for 
example, by altering the defi nition of nodes and 
edges in order to check whether similar results 
are obtained.
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SESSION III – INTERBANK CREDIT, MARKETS 
AND LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT IN LARGE 
VALUE PAYMENT SYSTEMS
The speakers of the third session, chaired by 
Daniela Russo, presented two applications 
of network analysis to large value payment 
systems (LVPS). Both papers were motivated 
by the need for the national central banks 
(in this case, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank 
and De Nederlandsche Bank) to gain a better 
understanding of the robustness of the domestic 
payment system. To this end, both papers analyse 
the topology of the payment network and perform 
a set of simulations in order to assess its stability 
when a highly connected participant is removed 
from the system (in the Dutch case, which was 
presented by Iman van Lelyveld) or with an 
operational incident at one participant’s account 
(in the Austrian case, which was presented by 
Claus Puhr). These exercises allow the authors 
to assess the relevance of contagion for the 
domestic LVPS (respectively ARTIS for Austria 
and TOP for The Netherlands) and the systemic 
importance of some players.
THE AUSTRIAN LVP SYSTEM
The failure of a large domestic bank prior to the 
crisis motivated Claus Puhr and his co-author, 
Stefan W. Schmitz, to start an exploratory 
analysis of ARTIS liquidity data using different 
econometric techniques. Their aim was to 
eventually extract some early warning signals 
from actual payments data. In the paper presented 
at the workshop, “Structure and stability in 
payment networks: a panel data analysis of 
ARTIS simulations”, network topology and 
counterfactual simulations are used to quantify 
the contagious impact of unsettled payments 
resulting from an incident at an individual bank 
level (namely from the inability of a participant 
to submit payments for the whole day).
The results of 63 different operational stress 
scenarios, for the period from November 2005 
until November 2007, reveal that only a few 
accounts are systemically important in terms of 
number and value of contagious defaults that 
they might cause per day (see Chart 7).18 
Also, transfer accounts cause signifi cantly more 
contagion than bank accounts (due to their 
centrality in the network) while, unexpectedly, 
operational shocks on days with higher 
transaction activity cause lower contagion.19 
This last and somewhat counterintuitive result is 
possibly related to the uncovered decreasing 
time trend in the number of simulated contagious 
defaults per day over the period from 
November 2005 to November 2007. This seems 
to suggest that the Austrian system has become 
more stable over these two years.
In the last part of the paper, the authors use a panel 
data analysis to assess the relative signifi cance of 
network topology indicators in explaining the 
high variation of contagion – as measured by 
(i) number of banks with unsettled payments; 
A “contagious default” occurs when a bank that does not receive 18 
a payment is in turn unable to send payments for that day.
“Transfer accounts” are ARTIS accounts held by other 19 
Eurosystem central banks at the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. 
All national TARGET components are directly linked by transfer 
accounts. All transactions to and from the respective country and 
Austria are routed via these accounts.
Chart 7 Average number & value of 
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(ii) number of unsettled payments, at the end of 
the day, due to an operational incident at another 
participant and (iii) value of unsettled payments, 
at the end of the day, due to an operational incident 
at another participant – both in the 
cross-section (i.e., among ARTIS participants) 
and across days.20 The results show that, out of 
more than a hundred indicators at network and 
node level, the best measures for the identifi cation 
of systemically important accounts in ARTIS are 
the number and volumes of (contagious) defaulted 
payments that a bank can cause. That is, following 
an incident at one participant’s account, 
the ensuing liquidity loss and the level of aggregate 
liquidity available in the system offer the most 
convincing explanations.21
THE DUTCH LVP SYSTEM
The second speaker, Iman van Lelyveld, 
presented “Interbank payments in crisis”, a joint 
work with Marc Pröpper and Ronald Heijmans 
on the topology of the domestic LVP system 
(TOP) and on the broader implications network 
topology might have for fi nancial stability.
First, the paper presents an intraday analysis of 
transactions processed and values transferred 
through TOP from June 2005 to May 2006. 
The authors then study the changes in the 
structure of the network over time in terms of 
commonly used network measures. These are 
size (number of active nodes); connectivity 
between banks (the ratio of actual to possible 
links); clustering (the probability of two 
neighbours of a node also sharing a link); 
and network correlations (whether nodes that 
make payments to many counterparties also 
receive payments from many).
They fi nd that the Dutch network is small 
in terms of both nodes and links, compact 
(with banks that are on average only two steps 
apart) and sparse in terms of connectivity over 
the period under analysis, for all the different 
time-snapshots used (1 hour, 1 day, or 1 year). 
Moreover, it is characterised by a few highly 
connected nodes linked to several nodes with 
relatively few connections. Interestingly, on 
a short time scale, not all of these most highly 
connected nodes correspond to the largest Dutch 
banks. For instance, one of the most connected 
hubs is a clearing institution. According to the 
presenter, this clearly indicates that network 
measures do provide an additional tool to assess 
the criticality of a participant from a systemic 
point of view, and to better evaluate the 
performance of the system.
The paper provides new evidence of the 
infl uence of the chosen time frame in the analysis 
of network properties. In fact, due to fi nality of 
payments in RTGS systems, links are extremely 
short-lived. This implies that the chosen time 
horizon is crucial when assessing the results. 
In the case of TOP, a ten-minute slice of recorded 
fl ows is already suffi cient to characterise the 
structure of the whole system.
In the second part of the paper, the authors 
study the vulnerability of the system to the 
removal, one by one, of the ten most highly 
connected participants. Looking at the impact 
of these removals on network properties and on 
settled volumes and values makes it possible to 
measure indirectly the role of highly connected 
players (either banks or clearing institutions) in 
the stability of the network.
Finally, the authors try to investigate the effects 
of the recent fi nancial crisis on the payment 
system by monitoring traditional activity 
measures as well as network properties in the 
period from June 2006 to December 2008. 
Consistent with the results of the previous paper, 
indicators in the Dutch payment system network 
also seem to add relatively little to the analysis 
once volumes and values are taken into account. 
Number 20 and value refer, respectively, to the total number and 
total value of payments that could not be settled by banks that 
did not experience an operational incident.
The authors selected 44 indicators at network level and 71 at 21 
node (stricken bank) level. Both univariate and multivariate 
analysis showed the existence of a signifi cant correlation 
between node-indicators and (contagious) unsettled payments. 
In particular, higher node-degree and connectivity and lower 
average path length are signifi cant in explaining higher contagion. 
Among network-level indicators, betweenness centrality – the 
average of all individual nodes’ betweenness centralities (see the 
defi nition in footnote 9) – turns out to be particularly helpful in 
predicting contagious defaults in the Austrian interbank market.
23
ECB
Recent advances in modelling systemic risk using network analysis
January 2010
DETAILED SUMMARY 
OF THE THEMES
The monitoring exercise reveals the absence of 
any noticeable disruptions in the Dutch payment 
system until the migration to TARGET2 was 
achieved in September 2007. A drastic change 
in the reconstructed network is clear after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers (see Chart 8). 
However, the migration to TARGET2 does not 
allow for an appropriate disentanglement of 
crisis effects.
MAIN COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION
Cornelia Holthausen, discussant for this session, 
highlighted the scope for further comparison of 
systems that, however heterogeneous in terms of 
volumes processed and number of participants, 
might nonetheless share a common structure. 
The striking similarity between the results on 
the Austrian LVPS and those obtained from 
analyses looking at the US Fedwire system 
suggests that comparisons among payment 
systems might be especially useful as a source 
of policy recommendations for the enhancement 
of network stability.
A key comment made by the discussant about 
both presentations concerned the absence of 
behavioural assumptions. Convincing behavioural 
aspects are excluded from a standard simulation 
analysis, where only the static consequences 
of each simulated scenario are considered and 
nodes do not react to the simulated triggering 
event. Holthausen argued that until adaptation 
in behaviour in response to shocks is not 
contemplated by network models the latter will not 
represent an appropriate tool for the assessment of 
systemic risk and of systems’ resiliency to shocks. 
This is because the current models “miss” the kind 
of strategic, non-cooperative, and self-reinforcing 
feedback loops that are crucial in the development 
of a fi nancial crisis. 
Another key issue raised in the discussion is the 
need for improvements in data and information-
sharing across national borders and across 
today’s numerous interdependent systems and 
markets. These are critical in order to gain a 
thorough understanding of interactions existing 
in the global fi nancial system and, therefore, 
to extend the network framework currently used 
for the analysis of payment systems to the study 
of broader questions about fi nancial stability.
Beyond the lack of any adaptation in behaviour 
following a shock, Holthausen questioned the 
appropriateness of some of the assumptions 
on which the presented papers rely on 
(e.g. the inability of a troubled institution 
to send any payment on a given day or the 
absence of strategic delays in settlement). 
In order to build a meaningful link between the 
analysis of network properties and systemic 
stability, elements such as the identity of 
market players, changes in the set of the most 
active banks over time or the potential scale 
of fi nancial obligations which are not refl ected 
in actual payments should not be overlooked. 
This is of the utmost importance in making 
network research results a reliable basis from 
which to draw regulatory implications.
Holthausen made an additional general remark 
to papers in this emerging fi eld of fi nancial 
network research, namely the need to identify 
more clearly the scope of the analysis at hand 
for policy recommendations. On this point, 
Puhr mentioned the importance of good 
business continuity arrangements, especially 
at the most important/connected nodes, as one 
of the main implication of the presented paper. 
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In the case of an operational failure at one 
account, allowing for alternative ways of settling 
at least the largest payments would greatly 
reduce the systemic impact of the incident.
In agreement with the discussant, and 
notwithstanding his confi dence as regards the 
contribution network theory can make to the 
analysis of the functioning of “the plumbing” 
of the fi nancial system, Van Lelyveld expressed 
some scepticism when it comes to the use 
of networks for the purpose of studying the 
vulnerability of the system. In fact, for broader 
fi nancial stability questions, more information 
is needed about what motivates participants’ 
payment decisions, especially in reaction to 
a shock, and about the way changes in agents’ 
choices might eventually reinforce one another 
in a non-cooperative way. Van Lelyveld pointed 
out how strategic behaviour is probably less 
relevant in small networks, where participants 
know each other.
In the ensuing discussion the importance of 
tailoring existing measures to the specifi c 
application and objective at stake was 
highlighted. The discussion following the fi rst 
session had highlighted the need to set up a 
careful categorisation of which particular 
measures are the most appropriate for the 
analysis of each specifi c type of shock. The 
discussions in the current session converged on 
the idea that the choice of the most appropriate 
time window for each specifi c issue at hand is 
an additional important issue to be considered in 
simulation exercises using fi nancial networks.22
Concerning the expansion of the scope of 
network analysis to study fi nancial stability, 
the chairman, Daniela Russo, pointed out how 
interdependencies across different systems 
and markets are potentially more important 
for fi nancial stability than interdependencies 
within the system. This is the case because these 
types of links have the potential to dramatically 
change the behaviour of market participants. 
Russo pointed out how, especially in a crisis 
situation, the behaviour of a player who is active 
in many different systems might be affected 
not only by a shock per se, but even more so by 
existing interdependencies among the systems 
in which it operates. As a consequence, the same 
player will behave differently in each system, 
even if it faces no liquidity hoarding or other 
strategic motivation.
 In particular, some participants argued that the resilience of 22 
the system to shocks is probably best analysed using a one-day 
snapshot, while shorter time windows would be more appropriate 
for capturing behavioural aspects and the sudden evaporation of 
trust that characterises fi nancial crises.
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SESSION IV – SYSTEM-LEVEL LIQUIDITY EFFECTS 
AND NETWORKS IN EARLY WARNING MODELS
The presentations of the fourth session, chaired 
by Mauro Grande, dealt with balance sheet 
interconnections between economic entities 
and the potential risk stemming from these 
links when shocks occur. Both papers have a 
similar analytical scope as they disentangle the 
web of claims and obligations present in the 
fi nancial system in order to gain insights into 
the contagious effects that can be rooted in tight 
fi nancial relationships. They differ, however, 
substantially regarding the units of analysis and 
the aggregation level at which the analysis is 
carried out.
The fi rst paper, presented by Sujit Kapadia, 
takes into account the intricacy of fi nancial 
systems as it examines the relationship between 
fi rms, domestic banks and international banks. 
The chosen network approach captures a large 
portion of the links between fi nancial agents, 
a feature not often found in existing network 
models.
In contrast, the second presentation by Juan Solé 
and Marco Espinosa examined consolidated 
claims and liability relationships across national 
banking systems. In their paper, simulations 
based on idiosyncratic shocks are analysed, 
leading to the identifi cation of systemically 
important as well as particularly vulnerable 
banking systems. Furthermore, the contagion 
paths, and thus the spreading of risk throughout 
the system, are explored using network 
techniques.
FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FIRMS, 
DOMESTIC BANKS AND INTERNATIONAL BANKS
The fi rst presentation was given by Sujit Kapadia 
on “Complexity and crisis in fi nancial systems”, 
a joint paper with Kartik Anand, Simon Brennan, 
Prasanna Gai and Matthew Willison.
Kapadia started with a brief overview of network 
theory concepts and their applications in 
economics, stating that tipping point properties 
and fat-tailed loss distributions are particularly 
important features of the current paper. The 
model used in the paper mainly consists of three 
distinct layers that are interconnected through 
cross-holding exposures of loans and equities:
1. a core of interacting domestic banks 
constituting a complete network;
2. a set of international banks, typically well 
connected to their immediate neighbours; and
3. a group of fi rms operating independently of 
each other but borrowing both from domestic 
and international banks.
The linkages among these entities can be 
summarised in a single restricted matrix, 
representing a large part of banks’ balance sheet 
items.23 Initially, a macro shock hits the system 
leading to corporate defaults that trigger credit 
losses for both types of banks under 
consideration, potentially causing their default. 
To let banks compensate for the capital loss 
suffered, the possibility of fi re sales is 
incorporated into the model. This distress sale 
of assets might lead to mark-to-market losses 
which can trigger further fi re sales in the system, 
provoking an even larger negative impact on the 
participants of the system. On the other hand, 
fi nancial entities primarily suffer credit losses as 
a result of a bank default, an event that can have 
knock-on effects, again leading to further 
defaults of other banks (see Chart 9).
Concluding the explanation of the basic model 
and its specifi c features, the authors describe 
the calibration of the model, using data from 
17 UK banks, 120 foreign banks and 50.000 
fi rms, stemming from various sources.
In a baseline scenario, an idiosyncratic rather 
than aggregate shock was considered, driving, on 
average, 220 fi rms into bankruptcy. This causes 
an average asset loss of 0.15% to domestic 
banks and 0.12% to international banks, which 
does not threaten the stability of the system.
 The matrix takes on a restricted form because it is assumed that 23 
fi rms do not lend and that fi nancial institutions only hold equity 
in fi rms and not in each other.
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As a second step, the smallest shock that can 
bring down the entire system is considered. The 
simulation shows that the system collapses in 
0.4% of the cases when (on average) 2700 fi rms 
default whereas in 99.6% of cases it does not. 
These fi ndings underline the tipping point 
property which is characteristic for such 
networks when put under stress, i.e. a sudden 
increase in distress in the loss distribution.24 The 
authors fi nd that adding fi re sales to the scenario 
increases the vulnerability of the system to much 
smaller macro shocks.
In the next step, the authors relax the assumption 
of homogeneity across banks in terms of the 
sizes of their capital buffers (4% for all banks) 
and instead allow the buffers to vary between 
4% and 24% across institutions. This softens the 
tipping point property of the loss distribution 
but, when the average size of collapsing fi rms is 
given a suffi ciently large value, the entire system 
may still default as in the previous simulations.
The presentation went on to draw a link to the 
current crisis and to highlight the increased 
vulnerability of complex fi nancial systems to 
Lehman Brothers-type system-wide breakdowns. 
Additionally, the model also emphasizes the 
potentially amplifying effects of mark-to-
market losses, an observation which has been 
Kapadia pointed out that, although in this scenario a 100% loss 24 
given default for inter-bank loans was considered, this sort of 
bi-modal loss distribution prevails even after this assumption 
is relaxed.
Chart 9 Mapping shocks to systemic risk
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made also in the context of the most recent 
turmoil. In this regard, Kapadia draw attention 
to declining capital buffers and increasing 
leverage in recent years. The authors argue 
that these developments, among others, can be 
partially held responsible for making the system 
more vulnerable to instability. The introduction 
of systemic capital requirements might therefore 
deserve more consideration, also in the light of 
recent experiences. 
At the end of his presentation, as a potential 
avenue for future research, Kapadia pointed to 
the need to incorporate liquidity risk into the 
modelling of systemic risk in fi nancial systems.
ASSESSING CROSS-BORDER LINKAGES
The second paper presented dealt with the 
topic “Network analysis as a tool to assess 
cross-border fi nancial linkages” and was presented 
by Juan Solé from the IMF, on behalf of his 
co-authors Marco Espinosa and Kay Giesecke.
At the beginning of his presentation, Solé 
stressed the potential of network analysis to 
become an important tool for cross-border 
surveillance. For regulators, it provides a metric 
to identify institutions that are potential sources 
of contagion. Furthermore, it can help to track 
contagion paths and offers a metric that can be 
used to fi nd out when and whether a fi nancial 
entity is “too connected to fail” in times of 
fi nancial stress.
In order to present the methodological 
framework of the paper, Solé introduced a 
stylised bank balance sheet identity that makes 
it possible to follow “movements” of balance 
sheet items when a shock event occurs. In the 
paper, the authors fi rst consider a pure 
idiosyncratic credit shock and then extend the 
analysis to a credit-plus-funding shock. These 
simulations are carried out for two different 
datasets. The fi rst one contains solely on-
balance-sheet items whereas the second one 
adds elements of risk transfer.25
In both simulations, the main aim is to trace the 
path of contagion among banking systems by 
following the transmission of the initial shock 
throughout the network. In addition, it is possible 
to identify systemic players within the network, 
i.e. those banking systems whose failures cause 
immense stress to their counterparties in the 
network. The fi nancial distress triggered by 
those players can trigegr not only to the default 
of other banking systems, but also the collapse of 
all systems under consideration. Another feature 
of the analysis is that capital impairment on a 
country-to-country basis can be easily displayed 
in a matrix form, providing useful information 
about actual counterparty risks.
As a result of the fi rst simulation, which applies 
the fi rst dataset, the UK and the US banking 
systems are identifi ed as important entities 
causing three and four rounds of contagion 
respectively, as well as 44.6% and 80% loss of 
all capital in the system (see Chart 10). Due to 
The data is taken from the BIS consolidated banking statistics 25 
(www.bis.org) which provides quarterly data on immediate 
borrower basis (on-balance-sheet items) and on ultimate risk 
basis (including risk transfers).
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their close linkages to the countries from which 
the shocks were assumed to originated, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland 
are found to be the most vulnerable to these 
particular shocks. Their banking systems fail 
in at least three out of the fi fteen hypothetical 
simulations in which they were themselves not 
considered as the trigger country. 
The analysis of the second simulation – the 
credit-plus-funding event – largely confi rms the 
results from the fi rst exercise.26 Again, the 
banking systems of the United Kingdom and the 
United States take on systemic roles, triggering 
even more hypothetical defaults than before. 
Surprisingly, the collapse of the French banking 
system now induces three hypothetical defaults 
compared with none in the former scenario 
(see Chart 10). Solé et al. argue that this might 
refl ect the important role of this country as 
liquidity provider in the system and that it shows 
the usefulness of including scenarios that 
account for different types of stress. The authors 
also demonstrate that the incorporation of the 
funding channel into the model increases the 
overall vulnerability of the network in terms of 
defaults and capital impairments.
However, looking at the transmission of a shock 
using the second dataset, i.e. including risk 
transfers, the results change. The resilience to 
shocks of Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland 
improves relative to the previous case. 
Furthermore, the French banking system becomes 
more important, inducing three hypothetical 
failures in both scenarios. Additionally, the 
relevance of the German banking system in the 
credit-plus-funding-shock simulation increases 
dramatically. Its collapse hypothetically causes 
fi ve other banking systems to fail. These new 
fi ndings lead the authors to conclude that, 
although the data on risk transfers used in the 
paper is of bilateral nature only, the additional 
insights gained from its use are noteworthy.
At the end of his presentation Solé concluded 
with refl ections on the policy implications 
of the presented work. First, he mentioned 
that, with an increasing interconnectedness of 
fi nancial institutions, a better understanding 
and monitoring of direct and indirect linkages is 
needed. Network analysis is one tool to assess this 
problem. However, as some participants voiced 
doubts concerning its empirical practicability, 
Solé referred to Chapter II of the April 2009 
IMF Global Financial Stability Report, where 
basic models of this kind are outlined.27
Furthermore, he emphasised that information 
about off-balance-sheet items and non-bank 
fi nancial institutions, as well as other fi nancial 
entities, need to be better incorporated into 
network analysis. However, since this is often 
not possible due to data limitations, he appealed 
for more joint surveillance as well as data 
sharing between countries in the future.
MAIN COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION
In his discussion of the two papers, 
Diego Rodríguez Palenzuela underlined the 
renewed importance of network analysis as 
a scientifi c fi eld and highlighted the value 
in exploring different approaches within the 
fi eld. Infl uences from innovative concepts in 
economics are needed, given the shortcomings of 
the established paradigm in economic theory in 
terms of foreseeing the depth of the recent crisis.
In this regard, he commended the efforts made by 
the authors to take into account the complexity 
of the fi nancial system, as both papers provide 
a contribution for a better understanding and 
monitoring of systemic risk. Regarding the fi rst 
paper, Rodríguez Palenzuela welcomed the 
effort to incorporate heterogeneous bank balance 
sheets, as this is a fi rst step away from the 
prevailing undifferentiated maximum entropy 
technique. He also complimented the authors 
for showing how macroeconomic shocks, asset 
market liquidity and network structure can 
cause system-wide credit losses and contagion 
via interaction. 
The authors assumed a 50% haircut in the fi re sale of assets 26 
and a 65% roll-over ratio of interbank debt (M. Espinosa, J. Solé, 
and K. Giesecke (forthcoming) “Network analysis as a tool to 
assess cross-border fi nancial linkages”, page 20).
 This chapter in the IMF Global Financial Stability Report of 27 
April 2009 was also written by J. Chan-Lau, M. Espinosa-Vega, 
K. Giesecke and J. Solé.
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As regards possible improvements, the 
discussant suggested the exploitation of real data 
to conduct stochastic rather than deterministic 
parameter calibrations, given that assuming, 
for example, zero recovery rates is rather 
restrictive. This is also true for the assumption 
that bank debt is completely illiquid. 
By construction, this rules out the possibility 
that banks might be able to soften the impact 
of a shock through the replacement of debt 
with equity. 
Another suggestion was made on the price 
impact of fi re sales as well as the selection of the 
trigger point that leads banks to start the selling 
of assets in the model. These distress parameters 
are modelled to be constant in the paper, whereas 
a varying adjustment depending on the state of 
the economy would be more suitable. The same 
is true for the parameter refl ecting the amount 
of fi rms defaulting, since the underlying process 
driving the bankruptcies in the models is not 
fully elaborated.  Hence, an early warning signal 
derived from the framework of the analysis 
would be rather rigid due to the underlying 
constant values of its parameters. Furthermore, 
Rodríguez Palenzuela questioned whether a 
log-normal distribution can correctly capture 
the fat tails correctly. He suggested using other 
distributions to install a more fl exible structure 
in the model.
As regards the second paper, the discussant 
praised its usefulness in assessing cross-border 
fi nancial stability risk using aggregated data. 
However, Rodríguez Palenzuela proposed 
incorporating country-specifi c default 
probabilities for fi rst and second rounds instead 
of simple country defaults. In his view, this 
would permit a more effi cient analysis of 
vulnerabilities. Moreover, a cross-check using 
other indicators or approaches to examine the 
robustness of the results was recommended.
The discussant concluded his presentation 
pointing to the need for further elaboration in the 
fi eld of network analysis, especially regarding the 
unspecifi ed role of time, the lack of fundamental 
theorems, the defi nition of a central measure for 
system risk and the unexplored nature of market 
failures. Until these challenges are dealt with, 
it is hard to see network analysis to be applied 
more broadly for policy calibration.
In the subsequent discussion, comments 
focused on the exploratory character of network 
analysis. 
In particular, the question whether and on what 
basis capital surcharges can be imposed upon 
systemically important fi rms or banks remains 
a challenge for policy makers. Adding to this, 
Solé stressed the point that fi nancial institutions 
are usually not aware of how interconnected they 
are. Consequently, they do not fully internalise – 
by setting aside additional capital buffers – the 
network externalities they might cause.
In addition, attention was drawn to the fact that 
network analysis, based on bank balance sheet 
models, often does not cause many players to 
default in the simulations unless large shocks 
are considered. However, as could be observed 
during the recent crisis, contagion leading other 
fi nancial institutions to come close to bankruptcy 
does not necessarily need to be based on a large 
initial shock. Therefore, future models need 
to account for this, e.g. by incorporating risks 
stemming from high leverage.
Based on these comments, Kapadia pointed to 
the need for more research on liquidity risk to 
be conducted, as this has been a main feature 
in the current crisis. Confi rming the importance 
of liquidity, Espinosa emphasised that they had 
already included such risk in their simulations. In 
the analysis, this indeed led to more contagious 
defaults and made banking systems generally 
more vulnerable to shocks.
Furthermore, a consensus emerged in the 
discussion that diffi culties remain concerning 
the communication to decision makers as they 
may not be fully familiar with network analysis 
and hence are frequently not convinced of its 
usefulness. Nevertheless, network modelling 
can help to identify entities that are “critical” 
for the stability of fi nancial systems, providing 
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decision makers with arguments for policy 
discussions. In this context, the important role 
of the research community in making network 
analysis a useful tool for policy advice and to 
adapt it properly to supervisors’ toolboxes was 
underlined.
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